Do Christians Have a Moral Obligation
to Support Agricultural Biotechnology?

Presentation to the Religion and Ecology Group
Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion
Nashville, TN / November 21, 2000

Judith N. Scoville (jscoville@northland.edu)
Hulings Chair in the Humanities and Assistant Professor of Religion
Northland College / Ashland, WI 54806

I. Introduction
"The most promising weapon in the global war against world hunger is high-yielding, scientific agriculture, including genetically modified crops." With this ringing affirmation, the ambassador to the U.S. Mission of the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture, former senator George McGovern, opened a recent opinion piece appearing in the Minneapolis StarTribune. He concluded his sharply worded criticism of biotech foes by stating:
But one compelling moral issue is clear: Every major religion and ethical formulation commands its adherents to feed the hungry. There is no room in Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, or any of the other great religious. . . traditions for those who turn their backs on the needy (McGovern 2000).

Do Christians have a moral obligation to support biotechnology to feed the hungry? If so, how does this accord with Christian environmental obligations? On the one hand, biotechnology promises environmental benefits-more production from current farmland with less use of chemicals. On the other hand, it seems to be another major step in the domination of nature by humanity; as such, it raises important questions about the appropriate limits of human intervention in nature.
In this presentation, I will limit my discussion to the genetic engineering of crop plants. This is the biotechnology that is being developed and deployed the most rapidly and is creating the most immediate concern. Obviously, I can do no more than scratch the surface of the ethical issues raised by genetically-modified crops, but I will try to suggest some fruitful ways to approach the problem and critique others that I do not find particularly helpful.

II. Genetic Engineering and the Problem of Hunger
A. Promised Benefits of Genetic Engineering
As George McGovern stated, the primary rationale for the development and use of genetically engineered plants is the need to feed a rapidly growing population. According to its proponents, only biotechnology can produce the needed increases in production without a substantial expansion of cultivated land, an expansion that would threaten wild or ecologically sensitive areas. In the United States, increasing the productive capacity of American agriculture by using biotechnology to reduce crop losses to insects, diseases, and weeds, can make up for shortfalls elsewhere.
Equally important is the goal of increasing production in developing countries, both for local consumption and for export, thus reducing hunger and poverty (Prakash 1999). Crops can be modified not only to resist pests and diseases with less use of chemicals, but also to grow in degraded soils, such as those with high levels of aluminum and salts. In addition, biotechnology can improve the nutritional value of basic foods. For example, "golden rice," enriched with vitamin A, has the potential to reduce blindness among children.
Although the biotech industry has trumpeted these benefits as part of their well-financed PR campaign, potential benefits of genetic engineering cannot be dismissed as mere industry hype. For example, a report issued by the National Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with six foreign academies, states:
We conclude that steps must be taken to meet the urgent need for sustainable practices in world agriculture if the demands of an expanding world population are to be met without destroying the environment or natural resource base. In particular, GM technology, coupled with important developments in other areas, should be used to increase the production of main food staples, improve the efficiency of production, reduce the environmental impact of agriculture, and provide access to food for small-scale farmers (National Academy of Sciences 2000, 6).

Such an appraisal requires serious, if critical, attention.

B. Denominational Statements
When denominational groups have addressed agricultural biotechnology, they have done so in the context of this promise to improve human nutrition, especially in the developing countries where both hunger and population increases are the greatest. In 1999, the Vatican's Pontifical Academy for Life affirmed the acceptability of genetic engineering in plants and animals, citing its potential role in solving the problem of world hunger. Like the Vatican, the Church of England has affirmed a role for genetic engineering in meeting food needs. In its discussion of the purposes served by GM foods, it states:
The world population is predicted to rise from its present 6 billion to 8 billion by 2020. Present resources, even if evenly distributed, could provide an adequate diet for only about 6.4 billion people. There is, therefore, a clear need to improve agricultural productivity. GM offers one promising way of achieving this end. . . (Church of England 1999).

In the U.S., the United Methodist Book of Discipline also welcomes "the use of genetic technology for meeting fundamental human needs for health, a safe environment, and an adequate food supply" (Paragraph 66M).
Religious groups who have approved the use of agricultural genetic engineering reject the idea that such genetic manipulation is "unnatural" or "playing God." Bishop Elio Sgreccia, vice president of the Pontifical Academy said: "We cannot agree with the position of some groups that say it is against the will of God to meddle with the genetic make-up of plants and animals" (Catholic News Service 1999: 21). The Church of England explicitly rejects the view that GM foods "are radically unnatural and that to produce them is for human beings to be guilty of the hubris of 'Playing God.'"
These religious groups are not unaware of possible adverse environmental, food safety, or social justice consequences. What is affirmed, however, is the acceptability of genetic engineering as a technology and the lack of any inherent limitations on its development. Ethical considerations focus on consequences-the benefits and risks of new technology-rather than questions of intrinsic right and wrong. This is particularly the case with genetically modified plants, which do not raise the kinds of animal welfare/animal rights issues as does the genetic engineering of animals.

III. The Perspective of Ecotheology
In contrast to this instrumental valuing of nature, ecotheology has affirmed intrinsic values in nature; intrinsic value is not limited to humans. For James A. Nash, intrinsic value in nature is based on an understanding of the natural world as God's creation, a creation that God values apart from its usefulness to humanity. This requires extending Christian love to nature, the demands of which can be understood in terms of justice and rights. (Nash 1991). Richard A. Young, writing from an evangelical perspective, states that "nature has intrinsic value by virtue of its being planned, created, owned, and sustained by God" (Young 1994, 82). Respect for the intrinsic value of nature takes the form of stewardship based on obedience to God and God's purposes for all of creation. For process theologians such as Jay B. McDaniel, intrinsic value is grounded in the intrinsic value of experience and is thus independent of any outside valuation. It requires respect for the rights of all creatures and the practice of the virtues of reverence for life, noninjury, and active goodwill toward all (McDaniel 1989, 73).
According to Nash, respect for the rights of non-human organisms includes "the right to reproduce their own kind without humanly-induced chemical, radioactive, hybridized, or bioengineered aberrations" (Nash 1993, 156 italics in original). For Thomas Berry, "to enter into the genetic structure of any being is to enter into its most sacred and most intimate reality (Clugston 1994, 3). The intrinsic value of the organism thus stands in opposition to genetic manipulation.
Respect is due not only to individual creatures, however, but also to the integrity of the biosphere and the evolutionary and ecological processes by which it has come to be. Speaking of genetic technologies, Nash states:
Respect for evolutionary legacies and ecological relations (about which even the biological sciences know remarkably little) are strong reasons for strong constraints on the new technology (1991: 62).

Berry, too, bases his opposition to genetic engineering on both these grounds.
. . . It should be clear by now that we have neither the intelligence nor the discipline required for any general or long-term beneficial improvement upon what nature is doing at the deeper level of its functioning (Clugston 1994: 3).

A second major limitation on GE, then, is respect for the wisdom and integrity of natural processes through which the natural world has come to be and is maintained. The natural order reflects God's created order, which we are obligated to respect (Nash 1993, 148).
Nash turns to just war theory for criteria to guide in adjudicating conflicts between intrinsic values in nature and the instrumental value of nature to humans. According to Nash, "biotic rights can be nullified only for 'just causes.'" Furthermore, abrogation of rights are justified only as a 'last resort,' only to the extent necessary, and only in accord with principles of discrimination and proportionality (Nash 1993, 160). While Nash does not rule out genetic modification for compelling human needs, "convenience, comfort, commodities, and commercialization" are not adequate justifications for genetically modifying organisms (1991: 62).
Yet compelling human needs are precisely what have made both Christian denominations and Christian bioethicists remarkably open to the use of genetic engineering in agriculture as well as in human medicine. Risks are measured against the promised benefits. In the agricultural sphere, the urgency created by projected food needs tends to overwhelm all other ethical considerations. It would seem that the responses of the Vatican, the Church of England, and the United Methodist Church are inevitable when the question is framed in this way. Counsels of caution have to do with concerns for possible health or environmental hazards and with just distribution of the benefits, not with the morality of genetic engineering itself.
In the end we are left asking: Why should genetic engineering be a last resort? Why should it be used only to the most minimal extent possible? Since the plants being modified are the products of long selective breeding, arguments about the wisdom of evolutionary processes or integrity of organisms as creations of God do not seem particularly telling. Furthermore, plants do not seem to hold a very high place in hierarchies of intrinsic value. John B. Cobb, for example, states in his discussion of creation in scripture that "God gives some creatures to others for food, specifically, plants to animals.... The text clearly implies that in the divine order of things, the intrinsic value of animal life is greater than that of plant life, so that the sacrifice of the lesser value for the sake of the greater value is justified" (Cobb 1992, 32-33). This accords with the hierarchy of intrinsic values in process theology, which is based on the capacity to experience (Birch and Cobb 1981, 151-53 ). Nash likewise affirms a graded model of intrinsic value in which "other things being equal in conflicts of rights, animals should be preferred over plants, mammals over mollusks, gorillas over mice, and humans over all other life forms," although such valuations must be made within the context of ecosystemic interdependence (Nash 1993, 158-59). In light of this, we must ask how much relevance intrinsic values in nature have for the ethics of genetically engineering crop plants.
What particularly concerns me, however, is the conflictual model of the relationship of humans and the rest of nature that seems to underlie this use of just war principles. Intrinsic values in nature, especially when stated in the form of rights, stand in opposition to instrumental values to humans. In eating, our most fundamental relationship with the earth, do we act in conflict with nature and its intrinsic values? What then could it possibly mean to say that we are part of a good creation?

IV. Reconceiving the Question
It seems to me that the whole argument about the ethical limitations of genetic engineering is wrongly conceived. The question of what ethical criteria agricultural genetic engineering must satisfy can be answered only in the context of a particular understanding of agriculture. If we see agriculture as inherently damaging to the ecosphere, as a necessary evil that sets us in conflict with nature, then our ethics will focus on limiting damage. The ethical task becomes one of weighing possible human benefits against criteria such as those suggested by just war theory. We can then ask whether the gains are sufficiently compelling to override biotic rights.
If, on the other hand, we see agriculture as a venue within which humans can live in a cooperative and sustaining relationship with the earth and with each other, we will focus on values in relationships rather than on the opposition of intrinsic and instrumental values.1 We will also need to begin with the question of what a just and ecologically sound agriculture-a truly sustainable agriculture-might be. This question requires us to critique the whole system of modern agriculture and industrial paradigm on which it is based.

A. The Industrial Model of Agriculture
According to Paul Thompson, the philosophical and ethical underpinning of industrial agriculture is productionism, in which more production is always better. "Measuring success in production of food and fiber is taken to be both a necessary and a sufficient criterion for evaluating the ethics of agriculture" (Thompson 1985, 48). Pointing to the great gains in productivity which have been achieved through technology, industrial agriculture looks to more and better technologies to sustain high levels of food production. These technologies, in turn, create pressures toward increases in scale, mechanization, and use of capital (Strange 1988, 40-42).
The ethic of productionism and the technological assumptions of industrial agriculture underlie two fundamental assumptions of biotechnology as a solution to world hunger. The first assumption is that hunger is caused by inadequate production. The second is that biotechnology alone can adequately increase production (Altieri and Rosset 2000a). Even as they give recognition to other causes of hunger such as maldistribution and poverty, the proponents of biotech point to the promise of greater productivity through biotechnology as the solution.
Biotechnologies are largely designed to ameliorate problems resulting from modern agriculture, while leaving the industrial paradigm that underlies it intact. In short, it treats symptoms, not the underlying disease. It is part of a mindset that sees no agricultural system other than modern, industrial agriculture as being sufficiently productive to meet present and future food needs-nor does it see other alternatives to reduce the environmental impact of modern agriculture. Thus the NAS report, which candidly recognizes the destructive environmental impact of modern agriculture, states that "the environmental risks of new GM technologies need to be considered in the light of the risks of continuing to use conventional technologies and other commonly used farming techniques" (NAS 2000, 19).

B. The Agroecological Alternative
There is, however, an alternative paradigm for agriculture, an agroecological model, which emphasizes biodiversity, recycling of nutrients, synergy among crops, animals, soils, and other biological components, and regeneration and conservation of resources" (Altieri, Rosset and Thrupp 1988). It embraces a broader set of values, including protection of the land and the welfare of rural communities. Small-scale, localized systems have been developed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that have resulted in very substantial increases in production (Altieri, Rosset and Thrupp 1998; Uphoff and Altieri 1999). These systems seek to fit agriculture into local ecosystems and draw on traditional knowledge as well as scientific research. In its reliance on ecological and biological processes, agroecology has resonance with ecotheology's respect for the wisdom and integrity of natural processes.
This is a slow type of development for it has no 'magic bullet,' no revolutionary new technology that is universally applicable. What it does have is an ability to be productive and sustainable on marginal lands, to more intensively farm lands than is possible in large-scale agriculture, and thus to make better use of land. The goal of this alternative form of agriculture is not simply production for markets, but also for family and local consumption. As Vandana Shiva has demonstrated, failure to take this type of production into account underestimates the productivity of local, small-scale systems and overestimates the increased production from adoption of Western technologies (Shiva 1989). Furthermore, small-scale agriculture promotes a more egalitarian society and greater opportunities for participation and security than do large-scale, input-intensive systems. Food First's Peter Rosset concludes that "it is clear that local and regional economic development benefits from a small farm economy, as do the life and prosperity of rural towns" (Rosset 1999, 7).
There is no reason why biotechnology could not have a role to play in developing farming systems based on agroecology. It would be, however, only a part, not the driving force. Its use would be based on how it fits into and contributes a just, sustainable, and ecologically sound system, not on the basis of a set of independent criteria.

VI. Conclusion
Christian responses to agricultural biotechnology have begun from one of three different vantage points. For most denominational statements and studies, the beginning point is with ethical questions raised by developments in science and technology. For ecotheology, the beginning point has been theological affirmations of the intrinsic value of nature. Neither of these approaches necessarily gets to the actual agricultural and social contexts within which the use of genetically modified crops must be assessed. Those who begin in an agricultural and social justice context, such as National Council of Churches' Agricultural Missions and the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, are better positioned to identify and address the issues raised by agricultural biotechnology. Perhaps this is why one of the most coherent assessments of the ethical issues in agricultural biotechnology has been produced by the NCRLC, which has long understood the relationship between agricultural systems, social justice, and environmental health (Warner 2000).
Christians do have a compelling moral obligation to strive for the end of hunger and to ensure that all have access to healthy, nutritious diets. Relying on biotechnology as the means to achieve this goal is an abdication of responsibility, however. The solution to world hunger requires rethinking the industrial paradigm of modern agriculture and envisioning and working for a socially just and environmentally sound alternative. Production alone cannot end hunger; those who hunger today are do not do so because of lack of world food production. In many cases, significant hunger exists in countries that are food exporters. Christian moral obligation requires us to address the underlying social problems of injustice and maldistribution of resources rather than being lulled by the promise of technological solutions.

End Note:
(1) I discuss relational values at length in another November, 2000 AAR presentation: "Fitting Ethics to the Land: H. Richard Niebuhr's Ethic of Responsibility and Environmental Issues."

References:
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Accessed at www.agbioforum.missouri.edu/vol2no34/altieri.htm.

Altieri, Miguel A. and Peter Rosset. 2000b. " Strengthening the Case for Why Biotechnology Will Not Help the Developing World: A Response to McGloughlin" 2000. AgBioForum 2: 3/4.
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Altieri, Miguel, Peter Rosset and Lori Ann Thrupp. 1988. "The Potential of Agroecology to Combat Hunger in the Developing World." IFPRI 2020 Briefs. Accessed at http://www.cgiar.org/IFPRI/2020/briefs/2br55.htm

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